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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Although it came as a shock to many, the rise of the Right
to power in the 1980 election has a substantial history behind it. The
story is one of complex configurations which have developed since the
mid-sixties across the political spectrum: disarray on the Left, a
vacuum in the Center, and coalition-building on the Right. This
political scenario is taking place in connection with a profound
restructuring of the economy, from one based on labor-intensive manu-
facturing to one based on services. Since most of the new jobs
created are low-wage and unskilled, the characteristic pyramid
structure of income and wealth distribution in the U.S. is changing
to an hour-glass shape. The middle-class is being squeezed out as
the relatively few jobs that are skilled are reserved for a profession-
al-managerial elite. During a period of transition like this, political
opportunities are opened - for example, the state could move toward a
social welfare state like that of Sweden where public spending and
taxation support expanded public services and collective consumption.
But mobilization for such an economic alternative would require
minimally, as Mike Davis points outs, "a high degree of conscious
trade-union solidarity, the creation of a broad labour/black/poor-
people's alliance..., and the international transformation of the
Democratic Party. In the absence of such preconditions, the Right
1. Mike Davis, "The Political Economy of Late-Imperial
America," New Left Review , No. 143 (Jan. /Feb. 1984), 20.
1
0has been able to muster support from the middle class that has
suffered economically during this last decade racked with recession.
In their campaign social issues such as the right to abortion and
school prayer, and economic issues around taxation have been combined
with an appeal to the fear of communism to gain substantial backing
from people who want decisive action taken on the problems which are
confronting them. But, although the New Right claims to have grown
from the grassroots and directs its attack at the Eastern Establishment,
it is not clear who exactly the leaders of the New Right represent.
The mere wealth which backs their campaigns throws into question
whether the New Right is a distinct class fraction or whether it is
actually an outgrowth of the political shift to the right of the
established elite. This study attempts to address this issue by
examining the socio-economic backgrounds, current positions and
activities, and elite connections of New Right and Corporate Liberal
think tank directors. By examining the differences between the two
groups I hope to provide better and more systematic evidence about
this issue than is now available.
Although there is little literature which deals specifically
with the social and economic base of capitalist support for the New
Right, there has been a continuing debate over the nature of the
divisions within the capitalist class. A popular theory which empha-
sizes the distinction between the ultra-conservatives and the corporate-
liberals is that of the "Cowboys and the Yankees." This theory was
developed by Carl Ogelsby (Yankees vs Cowboys", Guardian , 1968) and
3Kirkpatrick Sale ( Power Shift , 1975) to explain the rise to influence
of a new group within the capitalist class that has a different
economic base than the established corporate-elite. These "Cowboys"
are based in the South, Southwest and Southern California, and are
directors of rising enterprises such as independent oil, aerospace,
"new technology," and real estate. The Yankees represent the old
established wealth that is institutionalized in giant corporations
such as auto, steel, oil and chemicals. Based on different economic
interests, the one internationalist, the other isolationist, the two
groups are locked in a power struggle. The argument was used to
explain conflicts within the capitalist class of involvement in the
Vietnam War, Watergate, the Kennedy assassination and other issues.
A variation on the above theme, which avoids some of its reduc-
tionist pitfalls is Michael Klare's theory of the "Traders and the
Prussians." Klare maintains that the division within the ruling
class "cannot be differentiated on the basis of regional loyalties -
Traders and Prussians are found in botht he Northeast and
Southwest. Nor can their differences be reduced to an
"internationalist" vs. "isolationist" contest - both
factions are committed to the maintenance of a world order
predicated on the pre-eminence of American capital. But
they differ sharply on their estimates of the threats
to this ord^r and on the strategies to be employed in pro-
tecting it.
The Traders are mostly directors of the corporate-banking sector,
although they do include many "Cowboy" types; they are mainly con-
cerned with maintaining a strong and unified capitalist bloc. Where-
2. Michael Klare, "The Traders and the Prussians," Seven
Days (Mar. 28, 1977) 32.
4as the Prussians, who are an alliance of military officers, arms
producers, intelligence operatives, Cold War intellectuals and some
domestic capitalists, perceive the Soviet threat as paramount and
put U.S. national interests above intra-capitalist unity. Klare
points out, though, that this is not a precise and fixed framework.
In contrast to these two theories which stress division and
realignment within the ruling class, Ferguson and Rogers point to
what they call a "dealignment, the continued disintegration of those
political coalitions and economic structures that have given American
party politics some stability and definition during the past genera-
tion." In "The Reagan Victory" Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers
detail the history of the economic crisis of the 1970's, which made
it impossible for Carter to sustain a New Deal coalition of labor and
Dusiness. As the international economic crisis deepened, multinational
corporate and banking leaders were compelled to support a more militar-
ist foreign policy and tighter fiscal controls on the welfare state
at home, leading to the substantial support of the internationalist
liberal free-traders for the Reagan candidacy. This shift in support
was embraced by the Reagan camp, which is evident from the number of
high-level appointments of Eastern Establishment figures in the current
administration. Such support was critical to Reagan's victory and it
demonstrates that the Establishment still remains in control but has
found it necessary to move to the right.
3. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, "The Reagan Victory: Corpor-
ate Coalitions in the 1980 Campaign," in The Hidden Election : Politics
and Economics in the 1980 Presidential Campaign ,T. Ferguson and J. Rogers,
ed
. ,
53.
5The implications of these conflicting theories are just as
diverse
. If the New Right does constitute a distinct class segment
which was able to rise to power politically by a show of force in a
period of both economic and social crisis, then one might expect their
defeat as those same problems which they addressed so decisively per-
sist and deepen. But if the New Right is not a distinct element, but
actually only the shock troops for long dominant groups which have
shifted their political orientation, this might indicate a fundamental
change in the structure of the political terrain.
If one looks at Thomas Dye's chart on the policy making process
(see Figure 1), it is clear why I am focusing on major research insti-
tutes which represent the ideologies of the New Right, the corporate-
conservatives and the Corporate-Liberals respectively. It is in these
research institutes that the issues and problems which have been
studies previously by foundations and universities are refined and
transformed into governmental policies. The think tanks which I chose
to study are certainly not the only important ones from each category,
but I chose to limit my sample to five in order to keep the number of
directors under analysis manageable. The Council on Foreign Relations
and the Brookings Institute were chosen for the Corporate-Liberal
sector, following Domhoff who describes them as "ruling-class" insti-
tutions and organizations of the "power elite. The Heritage Founda-
tion and the Institute for Contemporary Studies were chosen from among
4. G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles , p. 182 and The
Powers That Be, p. 62.
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7a myriad of New Right research institutes due to their substantial
influence on the current Reagan Administration. For example, in
response to the Heritage report card on the early presidency called
The First Year
,
Reagan wrote Edwin Feulner, Chair of Heritage: "I
am looking forward to working with you and the members of this team
in pursuit of our common goals for a better America." 5 The Institute
for Contemporary Studies has had ties with Reagan since its inception
and has contributed such people as Caspar Weinberger and Edwin Meese
to his administration. Through its numerous and timely publications,
I.C.S. is able to promote its conservative analysis and recommendations,
and influence the government's policies. I have chosen two Corporate-
Liberal and two New Right think tanks for purposes of comparison; the
fifth think tank, whose directors are under scrutiny in this study,
is the American Enterprise Institute. It is perhaps the most inter-
esting of them all for its transitional position - during the last
two decades it has changed from being an ultraconservative institution
on the fringes to becoming a center for respectable conversative re-
search backed by more moderate, high-level executives. A number of
Reagan appointees have also come from the ranks of the A.E.I.
In the following section I would like to briefly describe the
history of the five think tanks under discussion. What becomes clear
from such an overview is that these institutions are not static
entities, but are constantly changing as the needs of the capitalist
system do. These are institutes of planning and social engineering,
5. Reagan quoted in Dorn Bonafede, "Issue-Oriented Heritage
Foundation Hitches its Wagon to Reagan's Star", National Journal
(Mar. 20, 1982) 502.
8each trying to develop policies which will stabilize the political
economy and get it under control. They have different ideological
positions which lead to conflict, but in their development, many of
their goals converge and means may become ultimately secondary, if a
consensus is necessary. As will become evident from this study
these groupings are integrated and revolve around a common axis.
The Institute for Contemporary Studies was founded in 1972
in San Francisco by a group of men who were close associates of
Governor Reagan in the California state administration. It sees
itself as offering another point of view, juxtaposing itself against
the Corporate-Liberal think tanks that have dominated the policy-
making process in Washington since WWII. They are unabashedly right-
wing and allied with Reagan and they actively propagate their ideas
by addressing current public debates immediately. They commission
studies and have them published within six months. With this barrage
of publications, they are able to get high publicity for their views.
This is a tactic that was very successful for the New Right, especially
during the 1980 campaign. Although it has had, up at least until 1980,
a small budget of about $1 million, its staff is also heavily inter-
locked with the A.E.I., the Hoover Institution, and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown. With these types
of connections, I.C.S. publications (including the Journal of Contempo-
rary Studies ) undoubtedly carry respect and influence with the present
administration.
The Heritage Foundation was founded in Washington D.C. in 1973
9by Colorado brewer, Joseph Coors, Paul Weyrich who was at that time
press secretary to former Colorado Senator Gordon Allott, and Richard
Mellon Scaife, great grandson of Judge Thomas Mellon, whose personal
fortune is estimated at $150 million. Beginning with Coor's $200,000
and Scaife's $900,000, the foundation now has a budget of $7 million,
(Scaife has given almost $4 million to Heritage and $1.7 million to
I.C.S.). For years Heritage had been promoting conservative propaganda,
but it wasn't until the Reagan victory that the foundation was cata-
pulted into the news. They had just published a massive 20 volume,
3000 page report called Mandate for Leadership which had been intended
to give the new President policy guidelines to follow. It quickly
became the "3ible for conservative policy-making." Of the 250 scholars
and analysts who worked on the Heritage report, "several dozen were
selected for high-level executive branch positions," according to
Heritage officials. ^ Like I.C.S., Heritage subscribes to the New
Right strategy of actively pushing its ideas in the White House, Con-
gress, and the national news media. As Sydney Blumenthal describes it:
Heritage... is self-consciously a para-party organization.
Ideas are its instruments for power. It wants not only
to manufacture beliefs, but also dominate government.^
It published prolifically and quickly, and uses its papers to influence
crucial committee hearings. They have also set up a network of conserva-
b. Karen Rothymer, "Citizen Scaife," Columbia Journalism
Review
,
July/August 1981, 44,47.
7. Bonafede, op . cit
.
, p. 506.
8. Sydney Blumenthal, "The Ideology Makers," The Boston
Globe Magazine (August 8, 1982) 42.
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tives across the country. The "resource bank" consists of about 450
research groups and 1,100 scholars and public policy experts, who
are available to appear as expert witnesses at congressional and
administrative agency hearings. Heritage’s activist role in con-
junction with the American Enterprise Institute is summed up by
Burton Yale Pines, Heritage’s vice-president for research like this:
A.E.I. is more philosophical and takes a broader approach to issues.
This allows us to complement each other. In some ways, we're the
infantry and A.E.I. is the artillery with the big guns." 9
The American Enterprise Institute has certainly acquired "big
guns, but it hasn’t alv/ays had so much clout. It was founded in
1943 by Lewis H. Brown of the Johns-Manville Corporation, who wanted
to restore free-market economics in the wake of the New Deal. In
the fifties, William Baroody, Sr. became president and changed the
name to its current form. He was determined to create of the
organization a center for conservative intellectual activity. Slowly,
conservatism created its stronghold within the Republican Party and
by the end of the Goldwater campaign, for which Baroody managed the
policy development and speechwriting, its base had expanded. But it
wasn't until the end of the Ford Administration, when many prominent
Ford officials became visiting fellows of the Institute, that A.E.I.
finally attained the prestige and the corporate connections that would
put it in a position to rival Brookings. Now more than 600 major
corporations give to A,E.I. and its annual budget is more than $12
million. From an association whose publications had been considered
9. Pines quoted in Bonafede, op . cit
.
, p. 505.
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poor academically and simply a mouthpiece for corporations, A.E.I.
has become a research institute that rapidly turns out highly respected,
influential papers on major hot policy issues from deregulation of
industry to defense and foreign policy. Although generally, A.E.I. 's
staff share a belief in laissez-faire economics and limited government
intervention in the social sphere, their scholarly research is con-
sidered responsibly conservative. By paying alot of attention to the
marketing of their ideas through the news media, television programs,
radio, four magazines, conferences for the press and policy-makers,
and seminars for corporate executives, A.E.I.'s voice is being heard.
And with 23 of A.E.I.'s staff appointed to administrative positions,
such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.; James C.
Miller, 3rd at the Office of Management and Budget; Michael Novak,
special U.S. representative to the United Nations Human Rights con-
ference in Geneva; Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council
and Lawrence Korb, one of six key undersecretaries in the Defense
Department, the influence of A.E.I. on the Reagan administration
cannot be overestimated.
It is said that A.E.I. *s success is due to their timeliness —
the right ideas at the right time. It is the right time because we
are in a critical stage of capitalist development. David Gordon,
Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich argue that what is occurring is
a fundamental restructuring of some basic institutions as a new
"social structure of accumulation" is being formed. This theory
is built on the theory that the capitalist economy experiences
12
"long-waves," that is, cycles of approximately 25-30 years of rapid
growth followed by a period of slow growth. The economic cycle
develops within an inter-related structure of social, political and
economic institutions, and when this structure develops critical
problems, it must change in order to survive. We are now in the midst
of such a crisis which began in the early seventies with the onset
of "stagflation."
The Brookings Institute is one of the leading institutions of
the corporate-banking sector. Founded in 1916 as the Institute of
Government Research, it later merged with the Institute of Government
Research and the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and
Government. It has always been a source of expertise and advice
for the federal government. In its early days, it worked closely
with the National Civic Federation. The N.C.F. was a powerful
coalition of business leaders, formed at the turn of the century.
It tried to mediate between the struggle of capital and labor. By
pushing a program of reforms the N.C.F. was able to play an important
role in containing the strength of the growing labor movement. And
it was in respect to the N.C.F. that James Weinstein developed the
Corporate-Liberal theory which maintains that these early corporate
managers are responsible for the assumptions and ideology that have
guided modern corporate leaders till the present day. In 1927, Brook-
ings received large donations from Robert Brookings and from the
Carnegie, Rockefeller, and George Eastman foundations. Its board
of trustees was made up of the biggest businessmen and corporate
13
lawyers of the time. Founded on principles of the Progressive Era
(regulation of big business, municipal reform, and economy and effi-
ciency in government), 3rookings became the dominant policy-planning
group of the sixties. It played a major role in the formulation of
Keynesian domestic policies of the Kennedy—Johnson era. With the
Republican victories in 1968 and 1972, it became the center for
opposition budgetary proposals. And then, with the Carter Administra-
tion, it resumed its crucial advisory role.
The last research institute whose board I am examining is the
Council on Foreign Relations. Established in 1921, it brought together
elite members of the corporate-banking sector to discuss world
problems and international relations. It is now made up of 1,500
bankers, lawyers, and corporate executives, plus journalists and subject-
area specialists. "It is entirely accurate to say that no major
figure in the shaping of American foreign policy over the last half
of the century has not been a C.F.R. member."^ The C.F.R.'s most
important sources of income are from leading corporations and founda-
tions. It is a prime example of how the policy formation process is
interlocked. For instance, the major foundations which have contributed
to the C.F.R. have been the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Cor-
poration, and the Ford Foundation. The directors of the foundations
are men from Bechtel Construction, Chase Manhattan, Cummins Engine,
Corning Glass, Kimberly-Clark, Monsanto Chemical and many others.
10. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Murray J. Edelman, American
Politics: Policies, Power, and Change , 4th edition, p. 241.
14
furthermore, most foundation directors are also members of the
C.F.R. As opposed to the New Right's marketing of ideas, the C.F.R.'s
discussions are not publicized and it is only from time to time that
a book is published which contains C.F.R. recommendations. It is
more often the case that C.F.R. conclusions are simply made into
governmental policy. A few of the major decisions credited to the
C.F.R. are: (1) every major part of the post-WUII peace settlement;
(2) the Marshall Plan; (3) the containment policy regarding the
USSR; and (4) the subnuclear force strategies that led to the Vietnam
11. Ibid.
CHAPTER II
Methods
Given that the focus of this study is on the corporate funding
of the New Right think tanks, it would have been the easiest to examine
the think tanks full and complete data on funding. However, they are
not required legally to supply such information and most are unwilling
to do so. Thus, I had to take an indirect route to assessing their
resources, and that was to study the connections that the directors
of the boards have to business. In this way one should be able to
ascertain the extent of the support for Mew Right politics within the
capitalist class. This also affords the opportunity to look at the
socio-economic backgrounds of these trustees and compare the New
Right with the corporate elite to see what their relationship is.
The number of directors from these five think tanks comes to a
total of 109, four of whom were not listed in the available biographical
sources. These four directors are from the New Right think tanks:
Joseph R. Keys, chair of Joseph R. Keys Enterprises, Cannon Beach,
Oregon; J.F. (Fritz) Rench, President of Racine Industrial Plant Inc.,
Racine, Wisconsin; and Frank J. Walton, former Heritage president, are
all trustees of the Heritage Foundation; Francis A. O'Connell, Jr.,
consultant, is a director of the Institute for Contemporary Studies.
The sources used to compile the biographical information on the direct-
ors were the standard references such as the most recent Marquis Who '
s
Who publications; corporate affiliations were found in Standard and
15
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Poor ' s Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives and Dun
and Bradstreet's Reference 3ook of Corporate Management
. 1982-83
.
In order to gather information on the four missing directors, I
checked both the last ten years of the Washington Post and New York
Times indexes and wrote to Heritage and I.C.S. for biographies, but
received no results. Time and expense limited my research and I
had to continue my study on the basis of the 105 directors.
From the available data I want to test the notion that the
material base of the New Right is different than that of the established
elite. If the Cowboy-Yankee theory is correct, then compared to di-
rectors of Corporate—Liberal think tanks, directors of New Right
think tanks should:
1. be more concentrated geographically in the South and
Southwest
,
2. have more directorships of "rising" industries or
entrepreneurial enterprises,
3. have less elite college educations,
4. have less memberships in exclusive gentlemen's clubs,
5. have less directorships in the corporate-banking
sector
,
6. have less memberships in ' para-statal
'
policy-formation
organizations, and
7. have held fewer top-level governmental or advisory posts
in the Federal government.
In order to examine the above points data was systematically
17
collected on the following aspects of each director: age, geographic
region of residency, listing in the Social Register
, attendance of an
elite prepatory school, attendance of an elite college, level of edu-
cation achieved, membership in an exclusive club, directorships of
Fortune 500 companies, elite governmental or university positions,
directorships of other research institutes, directorships of elite uni-
versities or foundations, membership in charitable or cultural organi-
zations, membership in elite business associations, appointment to
elite government committees, party affiliation, and membership in either
the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) or the Trilateral
Commission. In the tables which describe the results I have combined
the two New Right think tanks and the two Corporate Liberal ones to
form two groups. This is necessary due to the small sample I am
testing. Within each category there aren't usually very marked differ-
ences, so by combining the think tanks along political and ideological
lines, the data is easier to understand and interpret. AEI is handled
separately because it behaves differently in many ways; it is no longer
reputed to be an ultra-conservative organization and I have found that
its directors differ markedly from the New Right's. In the following
section I describe the results of the study.
CHAPTER III
Results
Age
The category of age was chosen for analysis to verify the
hypothesis that the New Right leaders tend to be younger than those
of the Establishment. This hypothesis is based on two assumptions:
1) the New Right represents the "new wealth" of the post-WWII growth
industries, and 2) the New Right is a radical movement with populist
overtones. Both of these characteristics may be associated with the
energy of a younger generation. To test this hypothesis age cate-
gories were divided in the following manner: directors who are under
55 years of age are young, those between 56-67 are middle-aged, and
thos 68 and over are older. The tabulated results confirms what was
expected. (See Table 1(b)) Directors of New Right think tanks were
somewhat more likely than directors of Corporate Liberal think tanks
to be under 55 years old, but the differences were not very pronounced
(32.3% vs. 26%). Only about one-sixth (17.4%) of AEI directors are
under 55. Although these results do support the above hypothesis,
they are not statistically significant (p>.05).
Region
A basic tenet of the Cowboy-Yankee theory is that there has
been a shift in power from the Northeast to the Southern Rim. In
18
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order to see whether there is a relationship between the particular
think tanks and the geographical residence of their directors, a cross-
tabulation of these two variables was made. The geographic categories
of the U.S. Bureau of Census were used with two exceptions. (See Map
2) First, the South and the West were combined to form the Southwest.
In this manner all of the states which make up the Southern Rim are
included in the Southwest .* Second, Washington D.C. is considered
here a category unto itself because of its uniqueness: directors re-
siding in Washington D.C. often do so in relation to government service
and do not make it a permanent domicile. 16.2% of the directors live
there. (See Table 2 (c))
A relationship between the think tanks and the geographic resi-
dence of their directors is indicated by the results of the cross-
tabulation. (See Table 2 (b)) 61,3% of the New Right directors reside
in the Southwest compared to 17.6% of the Corporate Liberal directors
who do. Only a quarter of AEI's directors are from the Southwest,
whereas one-third live in the Northeast and one-third in the North-
central region. The relationship between the Corporate Liberals and the
^Kirkpatrick Sale defines the categories "Southern Rim" and the
"Northeast" as used in the Cowboy-Yankee theory in the following way:
the Southern Rim consists of those states which lie to the south of the
37th parallel - North and South Caroline, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee,
Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico
and Arizona; the Northeast "encompasses the entire quadrant east of the
Mississippi and north of the Mason-Dixon line" - Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New 9Jersey
,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois. “
Merging the census categories of South and West together is valuable
in this study because it does include the geographic region vital to
the Cowboy-Yankee analysis and virtually none of the directors in this
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Northeast might be further strengthened by the number of Northeastern-
erS hidden in the substantial figure (25.5%) of those Corporate-Liberal
directors residing in Washington D.C. That 25.5% of the Corporate
Liberals reside in Washington D.C. compared to 9.7% of the New Right
also indicates that the Corporate Liberals have stronger government
or para-statal connections. These results are statistically signifi-
cant at the .001 level.
Social Register
G.W. Domhoff, a leading scholar in elite research, has demonstra-
ted the usefulness of the Social Register in ascertaining social class
bacKground. rie considers it the "best guide to the membership of the
13
national upper class." Unfortunately in this case, only 23% of the
think tank directors are listed in the Social Register
,
which is too
small a sample from which to draw any conclusions. In addition, the
relevance of the Social Register listings is doubtful when one is study-
ing the divisions within the capitalist class, which may have developed
regionally along "sunrise-sunset" industry lines. Domhoff uses the
Social Register as a tool in demonstrating the existence of a socially
study reside in the Pacific Northwest or Mountain States. However,
the North Central region and the Northeast are not merged as Sale has
done because valuable distinctions would be lost in the statistics.
There might be differences in history, culture and economics between
the two regions which should be taken into account.
12. Kirkpatrick Sale, Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern
Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment
,
pp. 11-12.
13. G.W. Domhoff, Who Rules America?
,
p. 13.
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cohesive national upper class. He acknowledges that the Register
has certain drawbacks, two of which are important to this study:
U the Register is published for only twelve cities and has little
or no value for the South and Southwest, and 2) the Social Register
for Washington automatically lists the President, Vice-president,
Cabinet, Senate, Supreme Court and some ambassadors. Thus, to be
listed in Washington is not an indication, in itself, of upper class
status. Since many of the directors of the Mew Right think tanks come
from the Sunbelt region, and many Corporate Liberal directors serve
in high positions of the federal government, the Social Register is
problematic in an analysis of a Cowboy-Yankee split.
Prep schools
G.W. Domhoff also uses elite preparatory school attendance as
a valuable indicator of upper class status. An elite prep school
education provides essential upper class training, inculcating the
values, traditions, and manners of the upper class. It is here also
that children make social connections with their peers which will
form a basis of a social network to be important in their lives later
on. Information on secondary education is not often published in the
standard biographical sources, so I was only able to obtain data on
26.6% of the directors. The results of the crosstabulation, based on
such a small sample supports somewhat the Cowboy-Yankee theory (See
Table 3 (b)). Roughly the same percentage of the New Right directors
(42.9%) as Corporate Liberals (35.3%) attended elite prep schools.
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But, there is a very clear pattern of strong attendance of public
schools by the New Right and AEI (57.1% and 75% respectively) as
opposed to the Corporate Liberals (35.3%). From these results the
trend of the Corporate Liberal directors receiving a more elite second-
are education than the New Right and the AEI is discernible. However,
it is not statistically significant (p>.05).
Elite college/university attendance
The choice of college or university may be an indicator of social
class, especially if analysed in conjunction with other variables.
From 1900-1940, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and a few other Ivy League
colleges were predominantly institutions for the rich. After World
War II, as scholarships for the less wealthy became available and
other universities grew in respectability, this concentration of the
rich at a few Eastern schools began to change. Most of the directors
in this study attended college in the 1940's and the 1950's at the be-
ginning of this transition, so data on where they attended college is
noteworthy. In order to evaluate the college attended as an indicator
of social class background , the colleges and universities were divided
into three categories: average, top, and elite. The elite colleges
were narrowed down to the top three universities: Harvard, Princeton,
and Yale. The list of top colleges consists of other Ivy League and
well-respected colleges, and major state universities. The list of
"average" colleges and universities was compiled from all those colleges
which did not fit the above two categories. The criteria for judgement
30
of the "top" colleges were based on reputation and data on endowments.
The results show that 29
. 0% of the New Right directors attended on
elite university compared to 51% of the Corporate Liberals (See Table
^ (b)). This significant difference is further emphasized by the fact
that 41.9% of the New Right directors attended average colleges, where-
as only 15.7% of the Corporate Liberals did. These results are statisti-
cally significant at the .01 level.
Level of academic eduation achieved
The basic assumption of the Cowboy-Yankee theory in regard to
higher education is that the Cowboys value higher degrees less than the
Yankees. Judging from the percentage of higher degrees earned by each
group of think tank directors, such a conclusion may be inferred (See
Table 5 (b)). Whereas 22.6% of the New Right directors stopped with
the Bachelor's degree, only 17.6% of the Corporate Liberal directors
did; 22.6% of the New Right went on to earn doctorates compared to
31.4% of Corporate Liberals who did. There were more law degrees
earned by the New Right (32.3% to 21.6%) and more Master's degrees
earned by the Corporate Liberals (27.5% to 9.7%). A great difference
between the two groups is not indicated, but there is a general trend
for the Corporate Liberals to have gone further on in their education.
The AEI directors stand out as the least educated with about one-
third of its directors only earning Bachelor's, about one-third earning
Master's and only 4.3% with doctorates. These results are significant
at the .05 level.
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The list of "average" colleges/universities attendedtank directors consists of:
by the think
Brigham Young University
Carthage College
Davidson College
Holy Cross College
Georgia Institute of Technology
Hope College
Kansas University
Lafayette College
Middlebury College
Osgoode Hall Lav/ School
Pennsylvania State University
Polytechnical Institute of Mew York
Regis College
Rider College
San Deigo State University
Southern Methodist University
Texas A & M University
University of Iowa
University of Krakow
University of Minnesota
University of Nebraska
University of Oklahoma
University of Pittsburgh
University of Texas
University of Washington
Virginia Military Institute
Washington and Jefferson Colleg
Wayne State University
The list of "top" colleges/universities attended consists of:
Bryn Mawr College
Carleton College
Cornell University
Dartmouth College
Fordham University
Georgetown University
Howard University
Johns Hopkins University
Northeastern University
Occidental College
Purdue University
Stanford University
University of California, Berkeley
University of California, Los Angeles
University of Chicago
University of Michigan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
University of Notre Dame
University of Paris
University of Pennsylvania
University of Wisconsin
Wellesley College
Wesleyan College
The list of elite colleges attended consists of:
Harvard University
Princeton University
Yale University
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Exclusive club membership
Much of Domhoff's work bears out the validity of using member-
ship in elite social clubs as an indicator of upper class standing.
Domhoff has shown the clubs to be a means of upper-class intracommuni-
cation and social cohesiveness:
These clubs - familiar names include Links (New York),
Pacific Union (San Francisco), and Somerset (Boston)
- provide a convenient, relaxed, and private setting
where businessmen establish and maintain formal ac-°
quaintance.
. .Moreover
,
since affiliation with several
clubs in different cities is common, members have an
informal national network. ^
Of the total number of think tank directors in my study (105)
only forty-one belong to an elite social club from the list compiled
by Domhoff, and those forty-one belong to a total of seventeen clubs
(See footnote to Table 6). These figures in themselves indicate that
the elite social club network is tight. One would expect the Corporate
Liberal directors to be more involved in the circuit than the New Right,
this assumption is confimred by the results (See Table 6 (b)). Only
22.6% of the New Right directors are members of an elite club, where-
as 37,3% of the Corporate Liberals are. This is a considerable differ-
ence worth noting, but the outstanding figure is that of the American
Enterprise Institute, with 65.2% of its directors belonging to an ex-
clusive social club. These results are statistically significant at
the. 01 level.
14. Michael Useem, "The Inner Group of the American
Capitalist Class," Social Problems, v. 25 (1978), 232.
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affiliations with other
-research institutes
To demonstrate tne coherence within the political groupings a
table was made which shows which directors are also directors on another
of the five think tank boards in this study (See Table 7 (a)).
Although the table does not show any interlocking of boards between
these particular New Right think tanks, it does support a coherence
between the corporate elite: about one-third of Brookings directors
are on the Council of Foreign Relations. Also interesting is that
26% of the AEI's directors are also members of the CFR. Since the
Council of Foreign Relations is so pivotal in these results, it is
important to note that in this particular case I have included members
of the Council and not only board directors. Members of the CFR
number 1,400. I included members because the CFR is not a research
institute in the same sense that the other four are and membership
on the Council is a very significant indicator.
As mentioned above, one would expect more corporate-elite
directors to be on the boards of other major research institutes.
Such is the tendency shown in the results of the run: more than two-
thirds of the New Right directors are on no other research institute
boards compared to only about one-third of the Corporate-Liberals.
19.4% of the New Right directors are on one or two other boards,
whereas 49% of the Corporate Liberals are. About one-half of the
AEI's directors are on one or more other boards. These results,
although supportive of the Cowboy-Yankee theory, are not statistically
significant (See Table 7 (c)).
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Think tank directors were on the boards of
institutes
:
these major research
Adlai E. Stevenson Institute of International Affairs
American Petroleum Institute
Atlantic Institute for International Affairs
Bildenberg Meetings
Carnegie Institute
Center for Advanced Studies, Stanford
Center for Advanced Study inthe BehavioralSciences
Center for Inter-American Relations
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Committee on Economic Development
East-West Center, Honolulu
Hoover Institute
Institute for European Studies, London
International Center for Economic Policy Studies, NYC
International Institute for Strategic Studies
International Management and Development Institute
Lehrman Institute
Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City
National Bureau for Economic Research
Overseas Development Council
Rand Corporation
Resources for the Future
Southwest Research Institute
,
San Antonio
Stanford Research Institute
Trilateral Commission
Twentieth Century Fund
Urban Center, Columbia University
Urban Institute
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
World Affairs Center
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University and foundation boards
Data on whether the think tank directors are also directors
of elite universities and foundations was analysed because of the
hypothesis that universities and foundations seek trustees who not
only have money
,
but are also part of an elite transcorporate network.^
Business leaders who have a broad perspective also realize the import-
ance of being on such boards, since education and research are critical
factors for the good of business as a whole. We assume that the Cor-
porate Liberals tend to be more at the core of the transcorporate
network than the New Right and have a broader outlook, which means
that a higher percentage of them will be on the boards of the elite
universities and foundations. This assumption is strongly supported
by the statistics (See Table 8 (b)). 39.2% of the Corporate Liberals
are on elite boards compared to only 6.5% of the New Right; about one-
fourth of the AEI directors are on elite boards. These results are
statistically significant at the .01 level.
Charitable and cultural organizations
According to Domhoff, members of the social upper class belong
to many charitable and cultural institutions. It is a means for the
newly rich to make inroads into upper class society because participa-
tion in such organizations often leads to private dinner invitations
15. Michael Useem, The Inner Circle , p. 173.
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Foundations with assets greater than $100 million
Asssts (millions of dollars) Foundation
$3,146
840
636
366
336
Ford Foundation
Rockefeller Foundation
Mellon Foundation
Duke Endowment
Carnegie Corporation
The top privately endowed colleges and universities
Rank Endowment (in billions of dollars)
1 Harvard 1,013
2 Yale 358
3 Chicago 275
4 Stanford 223
5 Columbia 201
6 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 184
7 Cornell 163
8 Northwestern 135
9 Princeton 134
10 Johns Hopkins 112
11 Pennsylvania 95
12 Dartmouth 91
The list of non-elite foundations and universities on whose boards think
tan directors serve is simply made up of those that do not fit on the
above "elite" category:
Foundations
American Health Foundation
Jack Eckerd Foundation
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
George C. Marshall Foundation
John M. Olin Foundation
Universities
Bennington College
Brown University
California Institute of Technology
Eisenhower College
Fordham University
Hillsdale College
Ind. Colls. No. Cal.
Medical College of Ohio
Pacific Legal Foundation
Purdue University Foundation
Southeastern Legal Foundation
University of Iowa Foundation
National Right to Work Foundation
Polytechnical College of NY
St. Anselm College
,
-Manchester
,
NH
Southern Methodist University
Syracuse University
University of the Redlands
University of So. Calif.
Washington University
Williams College
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and inclusion m other upper class activities. Michael Useem also
stresses the importance of membership in these associations for
increasing the legitimacy of the corporate role in communities and the
enhancement of the business climate in general. The director who is
involved in elite community activities is most likely part of the
transcorporate network. Determination of the list of major organi-
zations was compiled from those that were noted in the biographical
sources used for the gathering data on the directors. As expected,
there is a pronounced difference between the number of New Right
directors who are members and the Corporate Liberals: only 16.1%
of the New Right are members of at least one such charitable or
cultural organization, whereas 52.9% of the Corporate Liberals are.
39.1% of the AEI are members. These results are statistically signi-
ficant at the .01 level (See Table 9 (b)).
Directorships of Fortune 500 companie
In order to compare the corporate affiliations of the think
tank directors, directorships on the boards of Fortune 500 and
Fortune Service 500 companies was tabulated. Fortune magazine
compiles an annual directory of the largest 500 industrial corporations.
To be listed a corporation must derive over fifty percent of its sales
in manufacturing of mining. Fortune also compiles a directory of the
largest 500 U.S. non-industrial corporations. This Fortune Service
500 ranks the largest diversified financial, diversified service,
commercial banking, life insurance, retailing, transportation, and
Table
9
(a)
Percentage
of
memberships
in
major
cultural
or
charitable
organizations,
by
individual
think
tank'"'
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The
,
1
i
St ° f IT'a
''
0r cul tural and charitable organizations of which thinktank directors are members consists of the following:
Charitable and cultural organizations
American Council for the Arts
American Red Cross
Boston Museum of Fine Arts
Boys Brotherhood Republic, N.Y.C.
Boy Scouts of America
Children’s Memorial Hospital
Columbia Presbyterian Hospital
Fresh Air Fund, N.Y.C.
Grand Central Art Galleries
Indianapolis Museum of Art
Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts
Louden Memorial Hospital
Metropolitan Opera Association
Museum of Contemporary Art
Museum of Modern Art
Museum of Science
Museum of Science and Industry
National Gallery of Art
New York City Center of Music and Drama
New York Hospital - Cornell Medical Center
New York Public Library
Philadelphia Museum of Art
Pittsburgh Symphony
San Francisco Symphony
Seattle Art Museum
Sloan Kettering Institute for Cancer Research
Smithsonian
Toledo Art Museum
United Fund, Greater N.Y.
United Negro College Fund
United Way of America
United Way of Tri-State
United Way / Crusade of Mercy, Chicago
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utility companies. In the tabulation, the number of directorships,
from 0 to 4+, was specifically examined to determine the degree
of involvement in the transcorporate network. The results show that
more than half (58.1%) of the New Right directors are on no Fortune
500 board compared to a little over a quarter of the Corporate
Liberals (27.5%) and less than one-tenth (8.7%) of AEI's directors
(See Table 10 (b)). 25.8% of the New Right, 26.1% of AEI and 27.5%
of the Corporate Liberals were on the boards of one or two Fortune
500 companies. And 6.5% of the New Right, 56.5% of AEI and 33.3% of
the Corporate Liberals are on four or more Fortune 500 boards. These
results are statistically significant at the .001 level. While support
ing the Cowboy-Yankee theory, they point to the significnt corporate
connection of the American. Enterprise Institute.
Directorships of non-Fortune 500 companies
41.9% of the New Right directors are on no corporate boards,
compared to approximately the same number (41.2%) of Corporate Liberals
(See Table 11 (b)). 22.6% of the New Right are on one board and 35.5%
are on two or more compared to 13.7% of the corporate elite on one
board and 45.1% on two. These figures are in stark contrast to AEI's
directors of whom only 13% are on no corporate boards and 73.9% are
on two or more. The results are significant at the .05 level.
Memberships in elite business or policy-making associations
90.3% of the New Right directors do not belong to a major
Table
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elite business or policy-making associations compared to 49% of the
Corporate Liberals; 6.5% of the New Right are members of one or two,
and 3.2% are members of three or more, compared to 35.3% of the Cor-
porate Liberals who are members of one or two, and 15.7% who are
members of three or more (See Table 12 (b)). Almost half of the AEI
directors are association members: 21.7% are members of one or two
associations and 26.1% are members of three or more. These results
are significant at the .01 level.
A major premise of the Cowboy-Yankee theory is the split along
domestic/international interests. In order to check this assumption
the distribution or National Association of Manufacturers membership
versus Trilateral Commission membership was examined. The NAM was
selected for its ultra-conservative position on international policy
issues and the Trilateral Commission for its committment to cooperation
among the industrialized democracies. This assumption is supported
by the results on Trilateral Commission membership (See Table 13 (b)).
3.2% of New Right directors are members compared to 31.4% of the Cor-
porate Liberals. The tally of NAM membership proved not so fruitful
since very few of the directors of any of the think tanks are members:
6.5% of the New Right are members compared to 2.0% of the Corporate
Liberals. These statistics are significant at the .01 level.
The closer one's connections to the Establishment, the higher
are one's chances of being appointed to an elite university of govern-
Elite university or government posts
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mental position. "In the governmental sector, the operational
definition of the elite is those individuals who occupy formal positions
of authority in the major civilian and military bureaucracies of the
national govememnt
.
”
16
In the academic world an elite position is
one of formal authority at an elite institution; in this case, the
twelve universities which control over half of the resources available
to private higher education and which are consistently ranked among the
’best' universities make up the list of elite institutions. The
tendency for those closer to the Establi shment to be appointed to such
elite posts is confirmed in the results (See Table 14 (b)). 87% of
the AEI and 58,1% of the New Right directors have not been appointed
to any university or governmental position compared to only 37.3%
of the Corporate Liberals. Only 4.3% of the AEI and 19.4% of the New
Right have been appointed to elite positions compared to 35.3% of
the Corporate Liberals. These results are significant at the .01 level.
Appointment to elite governmental committees
Appointments to elite governmental committees are an indication
of involvement in the Establishment network. The New Right, judging
from how many New Right think tank directors have been appointed to
committees (See Table 15 (b)), are apparently left out of the newtork.
Only 12,9% of the New Right directors and 21.7% of the AEI have been
appointed to such committess, compared to 45.1% of the Corporate Liber-
als. This is a considerable difference, significant at the .01 level.
16. Thomas R.Dye, Who's Running America
,
pp. 11-12.
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8°Vernmental committees include special commissions, "blue
ribbon citizen committees and "task forces" appointed by the Presi-dent and executive departments. The list of committees to which
^
the think tank directors were appointed consists of the followino*
Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea (National Security Council)
Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (Department of State)
Advisory Committee on Workmen’s Compensation
Advisory Council on Japan-U.S. Economic Relations
American Council on Germany
Brandt Commission on International Development Issues
Citizens’ Advisory Commission on Environmental Quality
Committee on Adjudication of claims of the Administrative Conference
of the U.S.
Cost of Living Council
Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Council
Joint Council on Economic Education
New York State Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
National Commission on U.S. -China Relations
National Council for U.S. -China Trade
National Council on Crime and Delinquency
President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board
President Reagan's Small Business Task Force
President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force
President's Commission on Government Employment Policy
President’s Commission on Personnel Interchange
President’s Labor-Management Advisory Commission
President’s National Commission on Productivity
President's Pay Advisory Committee
President’s Price Commission
Public Interest Advisory Committee
U.N. Comm, on International Commodity Trade
U.S. Treasury's Advisory Committee on Reform of the International
Monetary System
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Political party affiliation
Data on the party affiliation of the think tank directors
was too scarce in order to draw any conclusions: information on
only 34 directors was available.
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CHAPTER IV
Discussion and Implications
The results of this study support the theory that the New
Right has a different material base than the established elite:
—Three times as many New Right directors than Corporate
Liberals (61.3% to 17.6%) are located geographically
in the South and Southwest. (AEI = 26%)
Almost one-third of New Right directors compared to
one-half of the Corporate Liberals received an elite
college education. (AEI = 13%)
—More Corporate Liberal directors belong to an exclu-
sive gentlemen's club than New Right directors: 37.3%
to 22.6%. (AEI = 65.2%)
—
-42% of New Right directors are also directors of Fortune
500 companies compared to 72.6% of the Corporate Liberals.
6.5% of New Right directors compared to 33.3% of Corporate
Liberals are on four or more Fortune 500 boards. (AEI =
91.3% on Fortune 500 boards; 56.5% on four + )
—One-tenth of New Right directors compared to one-half of
the Corporate Liberals are members of elite business or
policy-making organizations. (AEI = 47.8%)
— 19.4% of New Right directors compared to 35.3% of the
Corporate Liberals have held top governmental or univer-
sity positions. (AEI = 13%)
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12.9% of the New Right directors compared to 45.1% of the
Corporate Liberals have been appointed to an elite govern-
mental committee. (AEI = 21.7%)
These results are all statistically significant. The one point
which remains unanswered by my study concerns the hypothesis that New
Right directors should be on more boards of directors of "rising"
industries or entrepreneurial enterprises. The results of the run
on directorships of non-Fortune 500 companies are not statistically
significant. But even so, the categories of Fortune 500 and non-
Fortune 500 companies do not capture the details of whether the
companies are "rising" industries or not.
Throughout this study AEI directors have been treated separately
due to their transitory position. From the results we can see that
they do, in fact, behave differently than the other two groups:
—They are spread somewhat evenly geographically across
the country.
—They have the least elite college education.
—They have by far the most memberships in exclusive clubs.
—They have the most directors who are members of three
or more "para-statal" policy organizations.
—They are not distinguished by elite governmental or univer-
sity positions.
These results are interesting in light of recent studies done
by J. Allen Whitt (1981) and Michael Useem (1983). In Whitt’s study
of the directors of oil companies, he addresses the important distinction
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between two types of corporate board directors: ’’inside" directors
who are managers of the company on whose board they sit, and "outside"
directors whose only connection to the firm is through their position
on the board. Directors who sit on several corporate boards are more
integrated into the corporate class than those who do not, which demon-
strates what Whitt calls the "extensive integrative function of cor-
porate interlocks in the U.S. economy." 16 He calls those directors who
sit on four of more corporate boards "big linkers." Thirty-one of the
think tank directors are "big linkers" (See Table 16). They share
certain characteristics which place them in a pivotal role of power.
The "big linkers" constitute the core of Michae Useem's "inner
circle." Because they are top officers of large firms and directors
of several other large diverse corporations, they "constitute a
distinct, semi-autonomous network, one that transcends company, re-
gional, sectoral, and other politically divisive fault lines within
the corporate community." 17 The characteristics of these multiple
firm directors parallel those of Domhoff’s ruling class. They are:
1) descendants of business elite families, individually
wealthy or members of wealthy families,
2) mutually acquainted,
3) members of exclusive metropolitan social clubs, and
4) influential in affairs of local community organizations
16. J. Allen Whitt, "Is Oil Different" A Comparison of the
Social Backgrounds and Organizational Affiliations of Oil and Non-oil
Directors," Social Problems
,
Vol. 29, no. 2 (Dec. 1981), 147.
17. Useem, Inner Circle
,
p. 3
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and in some colleges and universities.
Due to their ability to mobilize great resources in behalf of favored
policies and institutions through their social contacts and their
broader understanding of business interests, "big linkers" are likely
to be an important source of political leadership capable of
promoting the more general interests of the entire capitalist class." 19
As mentioned above, the characteristics of the leaders in the
"inner circle" typify those of the Corporate Liberals. "Big linkers"
are, in fact, likely to have a more liberal political outlook, i.e.,
they are likely to view Keynesian economics and social welfare poli-
cies more favorably than those corporate directors with more parochial
interests. However, the breakdown of "big linkers" among the think
tanks show that the American Enterprise Institute has proportionately
the most directors who are members of the "inner circle" (See Table 10
(b)). 56.5% of AEI's directors are on four or more Fortune 500
boards, compared to 6.5% of the New Right and 33.3% of the Corporate
Liberals. If we look historically at the development of the AEI,
following its growing acceptance as a moderate conservative research
institute which can now rival Brookings in terms of influence and
respectability, together with its growth in big corporate connections,
it becomes clear that its potential role in determining governmental
policies is great.
18. Michael Useem, "The Social Organization of the American
Business Elite and Participation of Corporation Directors in the
Governance of American Institutions," American Sociological Review ,
v. 44 (August 1979), 557.
19. Ibid .
,
p. 553.
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In conclusion, the results of this study support a cleavage
between the Yankees and the Cowboys. The New Right has significantly
fewer connections to "inner group" institutions (corporate, social
clubs, elite universities, political organizations and prior govern-
mental appointments). Consequently, although the New Right has been
able to attain power politically in the wake of the Reagan revolution,
they are cut off in the long run from the policy-making process. But
if Michael Useem is correct in positing that multiple firm directors
may constitute "a special segment of the capitalist class, if 'class
segment can be defined as a subset of class members sharing a social
location with partially distinct interests," then my data point to a
realignment of the corporate elite. That is, given the number of
big linkers in the AEI who are an integral part of the elite social
club and business associatin network, yet lack the education character-
istic of the Eastern Establishment, it is evident that they are also
part of the "inner circle." Their inclusion has contributed to the
rightward shift of the corporate elite.
20. Ibid., p. 556.
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TABLE 16
BIG LINKERS
Institute for Contemporary Studies
DONALD RUMSFELD
—chief exec, officer and dir. G.D. Searle Co.
—Bendix Corp., dir.
—Eastern Airlines, Inc., dir.
—Sears Roebuck & Co. (Chicago), dir.
Heritage Foundation
WILLIAM EDWARD SIMON
-
—Citibank/Citicorps
,
dir.
—I.N.A. Corp.
,
dir.
—Xerox Corp., dir.
—Dark & Kraft, Inc., dir.
American Enterprise Institute
WILLIAM 0. BEERS
—Chmn . Fin. Comm. & Dir. Dart & Kraft, Inc.
—A.O. Smith Corp., dir.
—Sears Roebuck & Co., dir.
—AmericanAirlines
,
dir.
—U.S. Steel Corp., dir.
WILLARD CARLISLE BUTCHER
—Chmn. & chief exec, officer Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
—ASARCO, Inc., dir.
—Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., dir.
—Texaco, Inc., dir.
CHARLES T. FISHER III
—Pres. National Bank of Detroit
—American Airlines, dir.
—Detroit Edison, dir.
—General Motors, dir.
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ROBERT S. HATFIELD
Chmn. & chief exec, officer The Continental Group 1971-81
—Citicorps/Citibank, dir.
—General Motors Corp., dir.
—Eastman Kodak Co., dir.
—Johnson & Johnson, dir.
—Nabisco Brands, Inc., dir.
HAROLD J. HAYNES
—Chmn. & chief exec, officer Standard Oil Co. of Cal.
—Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., dir.
—Citicorps, dir.
—Boeing Co
. ,
dir
.
—Hewlett-Packard Co., dir.
ROBERT HARVEY MALOTT
—Chmn. & chief exec, officer FMC Corp.
—Continental 111. Corp., dir.
—United Technologies Corp., dir.
—Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), dir.
—Bell & Howell Co., dir.
DAVID PACKARD
—Chmn. Hewlett-Packard Co.
—Caterpillar Tractor Co., dir.
—Standard Oil Co. of California, dir.
—Boeing Co., dir.
JACK STEELE PARKER
—Pan American World Airways, dir.
—The Continental Group, Inc., dir.
—Southern Pacific Co., dir.
—TRW, Inc., dir.
-
—dir., vice-chair of bd & chief exec, officer General Electric Co.,
1968-1980
WILLARD F. ROCKWELL, JR.
—
-Rockwell International Corp., dir.
—El Paso Co., dir.
—Lone Star Industries, dir.
—Magic Chef, Inc., dir.
HERMAN J. SCHMIDT
—Mobil Int'l. Oil Co.
,
pres. 1959-63.
—H. J. Heinz Co.
,
dir.
—N.L. Industries, Inc., dir.
—MAPCO Inc., dir.
RICHARD RANDOLPH SHINN
Chmn
. & chief exec, officer Metropolitan Life
—Chase Manhattan Bank, dir.
—May Dept. Stores, dir.
—Norton Simon, Inc., dir.
—Sperry Corp.
,
dir
.
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, trustee
RICHARD D. WOOD
—Chmn., Pres., & chief exec, officer Eli Lilly
Chemical New York Corp. & Chemical Bank, dir.
—Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), dir.
—Dow Jones & Co
. ,
Inc., dir.
WALTER B. WRISTON
—Chmn. Citicorps
—Citibank, N.A., chmn.
—General Electric Co., dir.
—J.C. Penney Co., dir.
—Chubb Corp., dir.
Brookings Institute
LOUIS WELLINGTON CABOT
—Chmn. Cabot Corp.
—Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., dir.
—R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., dir.
—Wang Laboratories Inc., dir.
Ins
.
& Co.
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FRANK TAYLOR CARY
—Chmn. bd. I.B.M.
—Merck & Co.
,
Inc.
,
dir.
—J.P. Morgan & Co., dir.
—Texaco, Inc., dir.
WILLIAM THADDEUS COLEMAN, JR.
--I . B.M.
,
dir
.
—Chase Manhattan Bank, dir.
—PepsiCo., dir.
—Am. Can Co., dir.
—AMAX Inc., dir.
—Pan Am World Airways, Inc., dir.
—Philadelphia Electric Co., dir.
—INA Corp.
,
dir
.
—Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., dir.
—First Penn. Corp., dir.
JOHN D. DE BUTTS
—Chmn. & chief exec, officer Citicorps
—Dark & Kraft, Inc., dir.
—U . S . Steel Corp., dir.
—
-General Motors Corp., dir.
—Chmn. bd. A.T.T. (1972-79); dir. 1967-81
ROGER WILLIAM HEYNS
—
-Norton Simon, Inc., dir.
—
-Times Mirror Co., dir.
—Kaiser Steel, dir.
—
-Levi-Strauss & Co., dir.
CARLA ANDERSON HILLS
— I .B.M. Corp.
,
dir.
—American Airlines, dir.
—Signal Cos. Inc., dir.
—Standard Oil oT Calif
. ,
dir.
—Corning Glass Works
,
dir.
ROBERT STRANGE McNAMARA
—Pres. Ford Motor., 1960-61
—The Washington Post Co., dir.
—Corning Glass Works, dir.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, dir.
—T.W. A.
,
dir
.
ARJAY MILLER
—Ford Motor Co., dir.
Trans World Airlines, dir.
—Levi-Strauss & Co., dir.
—The Washington Post Co., dir.
—Utah International, Inc., dir.
—Southern Pacific Co., dir.
—Wells Fargo Co., dir.
DONALD S. PERKINS
—Chmn , exec. comm. & dir. Jewel Cos.
—Time Inc., dir.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., dir.
—Corning Glass Works, dir.
—Cummins Engine Co., dir.
—Freeport-McMoran
,
Inc., dir.
—Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., dir.
—G.D. Searle & Co., dir.
JAMES D. ROBINSON, III
—Chmn. & chief exec, officer American Express Co.
—
-Bristol-Myers Company, dir.
—Coca-Cola Co., dir.
—Trustee Co. of Ga.
HENRY BREWER SCHACHT
—Chmn. & chief exec, officer Cummins Engine Co.
—American Telephone & Telegraph Co., dir.
—Chase Manhattan Bank, dir.
—C.B.S. Inc.
,
dir.
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Council on Foreign Relations
MICHAEL W. BLUMENTHAL
—Chinn. & chief exec, officer Burrough Corp.
—Chemical New York Corp., dir.
—Pillsbury Co., dir.
—Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S., dir.
RICHARD LEE GELB
—Chmn
. & chief exec, officer Bristol-Myeres Co.
—Charter Corp., dir.
—Tankers Trust New York Corp., dir.
—Cluett Peabody & Co., dir.
—New York Times Co., dir.
—New York Life Insurance Co., dir.
PETER G. PETERSON
—Bell & Howell Co., chmn bd. 1968-71
—Black & Decker, dir.
—American ExpressCo., dir.
—Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., dir.
—Federated Dept. Stores, dir.
—General Foods Corp., dir.
—R.C.A. Corp., Dir.
CYRUS B. VANCE
—I.B.M., dir.
—U.S. Steel Corp., dir.
—Mfrs. Hanover Trust., dir.
—New York Times Co., dir.
MARTHA REDFIELD WALLACE
-
—American Can Co., dir.
—American Express Co., dir.
—Bristol-Myers Co., dir.
—Chemical New York Corp., dir.
MARINA von NEUMANN WHITMAN
—Vice-pres., chief econ. General Motors Corp.
MARINA von NEUMANN WHITMAN (continued)
—Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., dir.
—Westinghouse Electric Co., dir.
—Proctor & Gamble Co., dir.
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Appendix. Boards of directors.
Institute for Contemporary Studies
Leif H. Olsen - Chairman of the Board
A. Lawrence Chickering - Executive Director
Shirley R. Chilton
Robert J. Derr
Eli S. Jacobs
Joseph J. Jacobs
Vincent W. Jones
William L. Knecht
J. Clayburn LaForce
Henry Lucas, Jr.
Richard J. MacLaury
Francis A. O'Connell, Jr.
Laurence H. Silberman
Judge J. P. Vukasin, Jr.
Glenn Dumke
Jan J. Erteszek
Donald Rumsfeld
Robert D. Stuart, Jr.
H. Monroe Brov/ne
Edwin Meese III
Caspar W. Weinberger
Founded: 1971. Staff: 12. Organizations, corporations and individ-
uals interested in developing and publishing public policy studies
and distributing them to leaders in government, the media and univer-
sities. Undertakes the study of an issue if it has some bearing on
the free-market system, is immediately relevant and has ongoing impact
and importance. Maintains Public Affairs Fellowship Program. Publi-
cations: (1) Journal of Contemporary Studies, quarterly; (2) The
Letter, quarterly. Convention/Meeting: annual - always January,
Pebble Beach, CA.
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Heritage Foundation
The Honorable Ben B. Blackburn
The Honorable Frank Shakespeare
Dr. David R. Brown
Joseph Coor
The Honorable Shelby Cullom Davis
Midge Decter
The Honorable Jack Eckerd
Dr. Edwin J.Feulner
Joseph R. Keys
Dr. Robert H. Krieble
Lewis E. Lehrman
J.F. (Fritz) Rench
The Honorable William E. Simon
The Honorable Frank J. Walton
Founded: 1974. Public policy research institute dedicated to theprinciples of free competitive enterprise, limited government, indi-
vidual liberty and a strong national defense. Publishes research
in various formats for the benefit of decision-makers and the inter-
ested public. Programs include: analysis of current public policy
subjects; monographs on major public policy subjects; seminars on
major fundamental issues designed to inform and encourage interaction
between policy-makers and the public; conferences on education and
business issues. Heritage Resource bank provides communication among
1000 academics and several hundred other policy research groups.
Departments: Foreign Policy Studies; Legislative Information; Research;
Resource Bank; Special Projects; Studies; United Nations Assessment
Program. Publications: (1) Background/Issue Bulletins, weekly;
(2) National Security Record, monthly; (3) Policy Digest (business
executives' newsletter), monthly; (4) Heritage Today (newsletter),
6/year; (5) Institution Analysis, quarterly; (6) Policy Review
(public policy journal), quarterly; (7) Education Update, semi-annual;
also publishes reserach papers, studies, books, and monographs
.
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American Enterprise Institute
Richard B. Madden - Chairman
William J. Baroody, Jr. - Chief Executive Officer
W. Wallace Abbott
William 0. Beers
John Burditt
Williard C. Butcher
Edwin L. Cox
Richard J. Farrell
Charles T. Fisher, III
Robert S. Hatfield
H. J. Haynes
Lewis E. Lehrman
Robert H. Malott
Paul A. Miller
Paul F. Oreffice
David Packerd
J. S. Parker
W. F. Rockwell, Jr.
Herman J. Schmidt
Mark Sheper, Jr.
Richerd R. Shinn
R. G. Wingerter
Richard D. Wood
Walter Wriston
Founded: 1943. Staff: 150. "Nonpartisan research and educational
organization supported by grants from foundations and contributions
from corporations and individuals." Aims are "to assist policy-makers,
scholars, businessmen, the press and the public by providing objective
analysis of national and international issues." Studies are commissioned
in the areas of government regulation, economics, energy, health, foreign
policy, defense, political and social processes, social security and
retirement, tax policy, legal policy and legislative analyses. Foster-
ing competition of ideas is a principal objective; the institute itself
does not take positions on policy issues. Programs and studies are mon-
itored by panels of distinguished scholars, a Council of Academic Ad-
visors and a program priorities advisory committee. Sponsors Francis
Boyer Lecture; bestows annual award. Maintains library of 8000 volumes.
Publications: (1) Economist, monthly; (2) Foreign Policy and Defense
Review, bimonthly; (3) Public Opinion, bimonthly; (4) Regulation, bi-
monthly; also publishes books, monographs and produces monthly series
of television shows. Formerly: American Enterprise Association.
Convention/Meeting: annual board of trustees meeting.
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Brookings Institute
Robert V. Roosa - Chariman
Andrew Heiskell — Vice Chairman
Louis W. Cabot — Vice Chairman
Vincent M. Barnett, Jr.
Barton M. Biggs
Frank T. Cary
A. W. Clausen
William T. Coleman, Jr.
Lloyd N. Cutler
Bruce B. Dayton
John D. deButts
George M. Elsey
Hanna H. Gray
Huntington Harris
Roger W. Heyns
Carla A. Hills
Lane Kirkland
Bruce K. MacLaury
Robert S. McNamara
Arjay Miller
Herbert P. Patterson
Donald S. Perkins
J. Woodward Redmond
Charles W. Robinson
James D. Robinson III
Henry B. Schacht
Warren M. Shapleigh
Phyllis A. Wallace
Founded: 1927. Staff: 220. Not a membership organization. Independent
organization devoted to non-partisan research, education and publication
in the fields of economics, government and foreign policy. Maintains
library of 5,000 volumes. Divisions: Advanced Study; Economic Studies;
Foreign Policy Studies; Governmental Studies; Publications; Social
Science Computation Center. Publications: (1) Brookings Bulletin,
quarterly; (2) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2/year; (3) An-
nual Report; also publishes its research in books and reprints. Formed
by merger of: Institute of Economics; Institute . for Government Re-
search; Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government.
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Council on Foreion Relations
David Rockefeller - Chairman of the Board
Winston Lord - President
John Temple Swing — Vice President and Secretary
Graham T. Allison, Jr.
Richard L. Gelb
Theodore M. Hesburgh
Lucien W. Pye
William D. Ruckelshaus
Martha Redfield Wallace
George S. Franklin
Edward K. Hamilton
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Lane Kirkland
Peter G. Peterson
George P. Shultz
Stephen Stamas
Franklin Hall Williams
W. Michael Blumenthal
Philip L. Geyelin
James Hoge
C. Peter McColough
William D. Rogers
Cyrus R. Vance
Marina v.N. Whitman
Walter B. Wriston
Founded: 1921. Members: 2031. Staff: 95. Local Groups: 37.
Individuals with specialized knowledge of and interest in international
affairs. "To study the international aspects of American political,
economic and strategic problems." Research projects are carried out
by professional staff advised by study groups of selected statesmen,
business leaders and academic experts. Operates International Affairs
Fellowship Program, awarding eight to 12 grants annualy for advanced
international relations research by Americans between the ages of 27
and 35. Maintains extensive library. Publications: (1) Foreign
Affairs, 5/year; (2) Annual Report; also publishes specialized studies
on various aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Convention/Meeting: annual
- always fall.
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